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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
I
In two recent cases,' the Supreme Court finally ruled on the controversial
issue of government aid to parochial schools. Taking what may seem to some
to be an absurdly simple approach to a complicated issue, the Court based the
legality of the aid on the type of institution involved. Aid to parochial elementary
and secondary schools was found to be within the forbidden area of the estab-
lishment of religion clause and therefore unconstitutional, while aid to parochial
colleges was found to be outside this area and valid.
II
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 the Supreme Court squarely met the issue of
whether a state subsidy to parochial elementary schools for teacher's salaries
violated the establishment clause of the first amendment made applicable to the
states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 The Court held
that the subsidies in question violated the establishment clause because of the
excessive entanglement between government and religion.
The Lemon decision consolidated three actions challenging the constitu-
tionality of subsidy statutes in two states. In number 89, 4 the appellants were
citizens and taxpayers of Pennsylvania attacking the Pennsylvania Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act5 of 1968 which authorized the Super-
intendent of Public Instruction to "purchase" certain "secular educational
services" from nonpublic schools. The "services" purchased were teacher's
salaries, textbooks, and materials. The funds were paid directly to the school
for the cost of these services. As a condition to aid, the schools were required
to use specified accounting methods in order to identify and separate the cost
of these secular services from the cost of the religious services provided. Reim-
bursement was limited to teachers who taught, and textbooks and materials used
in, certain secular subjects.6 Additionally, textbooks and materials used had to
be approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction and reimbursement
for any religious course was prohibited. The action was brought in the United
I Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) ; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
2 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3 The first amendment was first applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment in
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (freedom of speech). The religion clauses
were made applicable in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise
clause); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause).
4 Alton J. Lemon v. David H. Kurtzman, as Superintendent of Public Instruction of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 5601-5609.
6 403 U.S. 602, 610 (1971) ("mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science,
and physical education").
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which found that
the Act did not violate either the establishment or the free exercise clauses.
7
Numbers 569 and 5708 involved challenges by citizens and taxpayers of
Rhode Island to the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act of 1969.9 This Act
authorized payments of up to 15% of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects
in nonpublic elementary schools. These state payments were supplementary to
the teacher's base salary and payments were made directly to the teacher. To be
eligible, the instructor had to teach in a nonpublic school at which the average
per-pupil expenditure on secular education was less than the average spent in
public schools. The schools had to submit financial data to prove the eligibility
of their teachers; that is, break down their expenditures as to religious and
secular instruction. The teachers could only teach subjects also taught in public
schools ("secular" subjects) and could use only books and materials used in
public schools. They had to promise not to teach any course in religion while
being subsidized. Suit was brought in the United States Distirict Court for the
District of Rhode Island which found that the parochial school system was an
"integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Chuch"'10 and held that the
Act violated the establishment clause.
11
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded number 89 and affirmed num-
bers 569 and 570.
The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger, joined by
Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun. The Court
noted immediately that the scope of the establishment clause 1 2 is not limited to
the ordaining of a state church or a state religion:
A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one
'respecting' that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to
such establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.' 3
The main evils the establishment clause guards against are "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."',4
Keeping in mind the evils the establishment clause was designed to prevent,
the Court listed the three tests to be applied whenever an act is challenged as
violative of the establishment clause:
7 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
8 John R. Earley v. Joan Dicenso (no. 569); William P. Robinson, Commissioner of
Education of the State of Rhode Island v. Joan Dicenso (no. 570), both at 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
9 R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 16-51.
10 403 U.S. at 609.
11 316 F. Supp. 112 (D. R.I. 1970).
12 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
13 403 U.S. at 612; see, Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) ; Walz v. Tax
Commission 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948).
14 403 U.S. at 612, quoting from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
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First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion, . . . finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.'15
Examination of both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes and their
respective legislative histories portended that the motivating purpose behind both
was to improve secular education in all schools in the state. No evidence was
introduced to indicate that the legislative intent was to advance religion. The
improvement of secular education is a valid public and legislative purpose.' 6
As to the advancement or inhibition of religion, the Court noted that both
legislatures engrafted numerous restrictions upon the Act to ensure that state
aid did not reach religious activities. In the abstract, at least, the religious and
the secular are separable in parochial schools and aid given to one possibly
may neither advance nor inhibit the other.' 7 The Court did not decide, however,
whether the primary effect of these statutes was to aid or inhibit religion:
We need not decide whether these legislative precautions restrict
the principal or primary effect of the programs to the point where
they do not offend the Religion Clauses, for we conclude that the
cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes
in each state involves excessive entanglement between government and
religion.'
8
Thus, the majority effectively decided -the case on the third test--excessive
entanglement between government and religion. Rather than laying down a hard
rule in this area, the Court indicated that it will take a case by case approach
and will "examine the character and purposes of the institutions which are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting rela-
tionship between the government and the religious authority."' 9
Examining the recipient schools in Rhode Island, the Court found the
"substantial religious character of these church-related schools"'20 made the
arrangement fraught with the "grave potential for excessive entanglement"
2'
15 Id. at 612-13; the first two are from Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968) ; and the last is from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
16 See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947). See also Cochran v.
Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930).
17 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968). "[U]nchallenged in the meager
record before us in this case, we cannot agree with appellants either that all teaching in a
sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and religious training are so
intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instru-
mental in the teaching of religion." See also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 269 U.S. 510 (1925); contra, Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. at 236, 252 (1968) 252 (Black, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
603, 641 (1971). (Douglas, J., concurring).
18 403 U.S. at 613-14.
19 Id. at 615.
20 Id. at 616.
21 Id. at 615.
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which the first amendment was to guard against. Specifically, the Court saw
that: (1) the schools were invariably located close to parish churches; (2)
religious exercises were held regularly; (3) the buildings contained religious
symbols in both classrooms and halls; (4) religiously oriented extracurricular
activities were encouraged; and (5) the abundance of nuns as teachers created
a predominately religious atmosphere in the schools. 22 On the basis of this
information, the majority held that:
[T]he parochial schools constituted an integral part of the religious
mission of the Catholic Church. . . . This process of inculcating re-
ligious doctrine is, of course, enhanced by the impressionable age of
the pupils, in primary schools particularly. In short, parochial schools
involve substantial religious activity and purpose.
23
Proceeding to the form of aid given, the Court distinguished earlier deci-
sions allowing the states to provide bus transportation, lunches, public health
services, and secular textbooks to parochial students. 24 Chief Justice Burger
found these services to be religiously neutral-that is, their religious content
was easily ascertainable-while ascertaining and policing the neutrality of
teachers too closely involved the state with religion:
In terms of potential for involving some aspects of faith or morals in
secular subjects, a textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's
handling of a subject is not.
25
Because of the pervasive religious atmosphere of these schools, the state
could not, without violating the establishment clause, provide aid for teacher's
salaries on "a mere assumption that secular teachers under religious discipline
can avoid conflicts" 26 between their secular and religious duties.
After cutting off the state subsidies on this ground, the Court then forged
the other edge onto its sword. Immediately after deciding that a state cannot
merely give aid absent restrictions to parochial teachers without violating the
establishment clause, the majority then held that if the state does provide for
policing provisions and controls to ensure that the teachers are not teaching
religion, excessive involvement between state and religion results even then and
again the first amendment is violated! The provision for government evaluation
of school expenditures and inspection of school records contained in the Rhode
Island statute made "the relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive govern-
ment direction of church schools and hence of churches.
27
The character of the Pennsylvania schools and the restraints imposed by
the statute were found to be almost identical to Rhode Island's:
22 Id.
23 Id. at 616.
24 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (bus transportation); Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (secular textbooks).
25 403 U.S. at 617.
26 Id. at 619.
27 Id. at 620.
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As we noted earlier, the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to
ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role give rise to
entanglements between church and state.
28
Additionally, Pennsylvania required the schools to use prescribed accounting
methods to facilitate state inspection.
Another defect in the Pennsylvania statute was that the aid was given
directly to the schools (in Rhode Island, the money was paid to the teachers
directly). The Court felt that this type of subsidy was even more of a threat to
the separation that the first amendment requires. At least three earlier cases
warned of direct subsidies to religious institutions,2 9 and the Court noted that
varying methods of control and surveillance usually followed such direct grants.
An almost unanimous feeling among the Justices was that direct subsidies
violate the establishment clause.30
Almost as a postscript, the Court found another even broader base of
entanglement present in these cases. In communities served by church-related
elementary schools, the subject of state aid is sure to be a controversial issue.
Proponents and opponents of aid will each present and argue their views.
Candidates will take sides, and votes will be cast in line with the voter's faith.
The Court felt that political division along religious lines would prevent mean-
ingful discussion on more important governmental issues.
[P]olitical division along religious lines was one of the principal evils
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect . . . . The
political divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political
process.
31
The fact that these programs involved continuing annual appropriations of
continually larger amounts contributed to the potential divisiveness inherent
in such aid.
While joining in the majority opinion, Justice Douglas also wrote a con-
curring opinion, joined by Justice Black, in which he reiterated the limitations
of Everson v. Board of Education:
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
28 Id.
29 The Court cited Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968) and quoted from Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970). "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship
pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encompass
sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or adminis-
trative standards."
30 Id.; see Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970). (Brennan, J., con-
curring) ; 397 U.S. at 698 (Harlan, J., concurring) ; 397 U.S. 701 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 41 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
31 403 U.S. 622. The Court cited Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970).
(Harlan J., concurring); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968). (Harlan
J., concurring) ; Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 207 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
3 2
Justice Douglas subscribed to the view that no tax money whatsoever is to be
paid to churches or church-related institutions.33 He indicated that aid to the
parochial schools for secular purposes would inevitably aid their religious
purposes also and thus would always result in a violation of the establishment
clause:
Yet . there are those who have the courage to announce that a state
may nontheless finance the secular part of a sectarian school's educa-
tional program. That, however, makes a grave constitutional decision
turn merely on cost accounting and bookkeeping entries.... What the
taxpayers give for salaries of those who teach only the humanities
or science without any trace of proseletyzing enables the school to
use all of its own funds for religious training.84
Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of number 89 and concurred
in Justice Douglas' opinion as to numbers 569 and 570.
Justice Brennan agreed with the decision in numbers 569 and 570, but
thought that number 89 should have been reversed outright instead of being re-
manded.36 For Justice Brennan, the main defect was the government supervision
needed to ensure compliance with the establishment clause. Again, the double-
edged sword flashed: aid could not be given without restrictions because of the
pervasive religious nature of the schools and the type of aid given, while at the
same time restrictions and controls themselves entailed excessive involvement
between state and religion. He expressly rejected the argument that some state
aid should be given to parochial schools because they relieve the state of a
burden which it would otherwise have to bear.36 This argument was deemed
immaterial when compared with the consequences of a violation of the establish-
ment clause. Finally, Justice Brennan intimated that for him all direct subsidies
to religious institutions would "constitute impermissible state involvement with
religion.
'37
32 403 U.S. at 640 (Douglas, J., concurring). McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443
(1961) ; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493, (1961) ; McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948).
33 Accord, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1947). (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ; see 330 U.S. at 28, 41, (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ; Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 675-76 (1970). 397 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 253 (1968). (Black, J., dissenting); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 415 (1963) (Stewart concurring).
34 403 U.S. at 641 (Douglas, J., concurring); accord, Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 252 (1968). (Black, J., dissenting); Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
229-30 (1963). (Douglas, J., concurring) ; see also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1, 46 (1947). (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
35 Justice Brennan's opinion also applied to Tilton v. Richardson (no. 153), 403 U.S.
672 (1971) in which he dissented.
36 406 U.S. at 654 (Brennan, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 643-44, 652 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part. 8 He agreed with the
disposition of number 89, but would have held the Pennsylvania statute involved
therein valid on its face pending findings as to the character of the schools upon
remand. As to numbers 569 and 570, he would have held the Rhode Island
statute valid as not violating the establishment clause. He noted that the secular
purposes of both statutes were in line with constitutional requirements and that
the primary effect of each was not found to be to aid religion. As to entangle-
ment, Justice White felt that the controls used did not result in excessive
entanglement of the state with religion. He noted that the evidence showed
only one incident in Rhode Island where the state had to examine records and
segregate secular and religious expenditures.
As a result of this decision, a state clearly may not subsidize the salaries of
parochial school teachers at all:
The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and the
parochial schools. The State cannot finance secular instruction if it
permits religion to be taught in the same classroom; but if it exacts a
promise that religion not be so taught-a promise the school and its
teachers are quite willing to give-and enforces it, it is then entangled
in the "no entanglement" aspect of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
3 9
This result follows whether the money goes directly to the teachers themselves
or is paid to the school. The pervasive religious atmosphere precludes govern-
ment aid. The only solution for parochial schools to secure aid would be for
them to give up religious instruction entirely, something which the elementary
parochial schools of this country are not about to do.
Hinted at, but not discussed in any of the opinions was the classic statement
of Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting in Everson v. Board ol Education:
If the state may aid these religious schools, it may therefore regulate
them. Many groups have sought aid from tax funds only to find that
it carried political controls with it. Indeed this Court has declared
that 'it is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate
that which it subsidizes."4
The Court felt that to allow aid here might well be the first step down the
establishment path and clearly would be a violation of the first amendment.
41
38 Justice White's opinion also applied to Tilton v. Richardson (no. 153), 403 U.S. 672
(1971) in which he concurred.
39 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
40 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1947). (Jackson, J., dissenting).
41 403 U.S. at 624. Taking the first step in this area has been the fear of more than a
few Justices. See e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). (Black, J., felt
providing bus transportation was carrying to the "verge" of forbidden territory) ; 330 U.S. at
29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting, felt that the bus transportation was the first step into the
forbidden territory); Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) majority opinion by
Clark, J.); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 716 (1970). (Douglas, J., dissenting,
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III
In Tilton v. Richardson,42 the Supreme Court answered the question whether
a federal construction grant to church-related colleges violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment. In a five to four decision, the Court held the
establishment clause not to be violated by such grants.
The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Higher Educa-
tion Facilities Act of 196343 by citizens and taxpayers of the United States,
residents of Connecticut. The Act provided construction grants to institutions
of higher learning for physical plant expansion. Religious schools were found
to be eligible because of the language of the Act providing that the buildings
and facilities constructed were to be used exclusively for secular purposes and
expressly excluding any building to be used for worship, sectarian instruction,
or as part of a divinity school. 4 4 The Act was administered by the United States
Commissioner of Education who was required to ensure that the provisions of
the Act were not violated. The Act provided that the United States had a twenty-
year interest in the buildings constructed with such funds and that if the build-
ings were used for any of the forbidden purposes within that time, the govern-
ment was to be reimbursed to the extent of its contribution.45 During this period,
the Office of Education would make on-site inspections to enforce the restrictions.
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare was named as a defendant,
along with four church-related colleges in Connecticut which had received
federal funds to build facilities under the Act.46 The District Court found the
Act constitutional as having neither the purpose nor the effect of advancing
religion.
47
Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the Court joined by Justices
Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun. They acknowledged that no hard and fast
rules exist in the area of the establishment clause:
[C]andor compels the acknowledgement that we can only dimly
perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in this
sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.
48
Because of this, each case must be examined to find:
"[Tlhe present involvement of government in religion may seem de minimus. But it is,
I fear, a long step down the Establishment path").
42 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
43 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-758.
44 Id., § 751(a)2.
45 Id., § 754.
46 The schools and facilities built were: a library at Sacred Heart University, a music,
drama, and arts building at Annhurst College, a science building and library at Fairfield
University, a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus College. All are Roman Catholic
institutions.
47 312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970).
48 403 U.S. at 678.
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First, does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose? Second, is
the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion? Third,
does the administration of the Act foster an excessive entanglement with
religion ?
The purpose of the Act was to enable colleges to increase their capacity
so as to better satisfy the increasing demand for higher education. The preamble
of the Act stated that this expansion was needed to ensure the welfare and
security of the United States. Advancing the cause of education is a valid public
purpose and increasing the capacity of the nation's colleges is a valid secular
legislative purpose.
As to whether the Act had a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion, the Court rejected the 'composite profile' of a church-related school
which it had impliedly accepted in Lemon v. Kurtzman,50 decided the same day.
Each college was investigated and found to be "indistinguishable from a typical
state university." 51 Although some incidental benefits had accrued to the
religious function of the colleges, the enforcement policies of the commissioner
had ensured that the advancement of religion was not the primary effect of
the Act.
The Court accepted the rationale in Board of Education v. Allen 52 that
the religious and secular can be separated in a sectarian school to the extent
that aid to one is not necessarily aid to the other. This holding almost involved
an outright rejection of Everson v. Board of Education,53 long considered a
leading decision in this area, where the court stated that the establishment clause
meant at least that:
[N]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
54
Thus, the Court followed the limitations set down in Lemon that every case will
be examined to discover if the primary effect of the legislation was to advance
religion.
The Court next explored the record to find if the administration of the
Act resulted in that excessive entanglement between government and religion
which was found to inhere in the administration of state subsidies to parochial
school teachers in Lemon.55 Parochial elementary schools were found to be an
49 Id.
50 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (involving the validity at state salary subsidies to parochial
school teachers).
51 403 U.S. at 680.
52 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
53 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
54 Id. at 15-16.
55 This independent test of constitutionality was first announced in Walz v. Tax Com.
mission, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970).
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integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church. Those schools were
replete with religious symbols, and religious services were held as a matter of
course. The tender age of the students made this indoctrination even more
effective. The statutes in controversy in Lemon provided for government inspec-
tion-even auditing-of the school records as part of the policing provisions.
In church-related colleges, however, a marked absence of these religious
'affiliations' existed: (1) no attempt was made to indoctrinate students; (2)
religious symbols were conspicuous by their absence; (3) religious services
were not required; (4) college students were not as impressionable as those in
elementary schools; and as a whole, (5) the colleges were "characterized by a
high degree of academic freedom." 6
Since religious indoctrination was not found to be a significant purpose
of these colleges, the control and surveillance fatal to the Acts in Lemon were
not necessary here. This fact greatly lessened the potential for excessive entangle-
ment.
Additionally, the type of aid-grants for building construction-was more
"neutral" than the aid to teachers given in Lemon and more in line with the
"sterile" types of aid sanctioned in Everson (bus transportation) 57 and Allen
(textbooks) .5
Since teachers are not necessarily religiously neutral, greater govern-
mental surveillance would be required to guarantee that state salary
aid would not in fact subsidize religious instruction. There [Lemon]
we found the resulting entanglement excessive. Here, on the other
hand, the government provides facilities that are themselves religiously
neutral. The risks of government aid to religion and the corresponding
need for surveillance are therefore reduced.5 9
Finally, the Court saw that the aid given here was a "one-time, single-
purpose construction grant." 60 Thus, no continuing financial relationships,
audits, or inspections were required. The infrequent on-site inspections by the
Office of Education were considered to be de minimus.
Taken together these considerations lessened that potential for excessive
involvement between government and religion which is the purpose of the
establishment clause. Furthermore, because of the more cosmopolitan nature of
colleges and universities the potential for political division along religious
lines is not nearly as great as found in the community-centered elementary
schools in Lemon.
While upholding the Act, the Court did strike down the twenty-year
56 403 U.S. at 686.
57 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
58 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
59 403 U.S. at 687-88.
60 Id. at 688.
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limitation on federal interest in the buildings. Finding no rational basis for
that period of time the majority felt that allowing the school to convert the
building into a chapel, for example, after twenty years would certainly be an
advancement of religion.
Justice White cast what turned out to be the deciding vote in this decision.61
Although concurring in the result, he found that reasoning of the majority
to be anomolous to the majority opinion in Lemon, decided the same day and
also authored by the Chief Justice. He accepted the reasoning in the Allen case
that the religious and secular are not so intertwined as to make aid to one result
in aid to the other. He found, in both Lemon and Tilton, that neither the purpose
nor the primary effect of the statutes was to aid religion. Moreover, he found no
excessive entanglement present in either case and would have upheld the aid
in both.
Justice Brennan dissented 62 with the observation that all subsidies to
sectarian schools were outlawed by the establishment clause. 63 He was also of
the opinion, contrary to the majority, that even the on-site inspections created
an excessive entanglement between government and religion.
6 4
Justice Douglas also dissented and was joined by Justices Black and
Marshall. The main thrust of his argument was to refute the position in Allen
that the religious and secular are separable in sectarian schools:
A parochial school operates on one budget. Money not spent for one
purpose becomes available for other purposes. Thus, the fact that there
are no religious observances in federally financed facilities is not
controlling because required religious observances will take place in
other buildings.6 5
He reasoned, and with much force, that through the influx of federal money, the
parochial school system will remain viable and continue to pursue its main goal
-religious indoctrination. Douglas rejected the conclusion of the Court that
these colleges were indistinguishable from state universities. No matter how hard
they may try to disguise it, and they may in order to receive aid, the main
61 Justice White's opinion also applied to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
62 Justice Brennan's opinion also applied to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
63 403 U.S. at 643-44, 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting in Tilton). This view has been
expressed in more than a few cases and by a number of Justices: see Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 20-21, (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ; 330 U.S. at 28, 41 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 675-76 (1970) (majority opinion
by Burger, C.J.); 397 U.S. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 640-41 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also, Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 253 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415
(1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) ; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1951); McGowan
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) ; McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948).
64 403 U.S. at 650-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting in Tilton).
65 Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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reason parochial schools are in existence is to advance religion and indoctrinate
young people in the faith.66
Douglas seized on a point passed over by all the other Justices. "Once
these schools become federally funded, they become bound by federal stan-
dards."'67 In effect, they become public schools. In Engel v. Vitale,68 the Court
outlawed prayer in public schools. Accordingly, Engel would effectively prevent
the conducting of religious services anywhere on a funded college campus!
This result would not be a violation of the free exercise clause because of
Wickard v. Filburn69 which held that ".. .it is hardly lack of due process for the
Government to regulate that which it subsidizes. ' '6 9a
Finally, Douglas concurred with Brennan that the surveillance entailed
in this case-the on-site inspections-created a potential for an excessive en-
tanglement of government with religion which would be violative of the estab-
lishment clause.
70
Reconciling this decision with Lemon decided the same day and also written
by the Chief Justice is difficult. Surely Justice Douglas has a valid point when he
argues that such aid to sectarian schools will indirectly advance religion in
these schools. The money saved by the receipt of these grants can be used for a
chapel, a divinity school, or a myriad of other religious purposes. As Douglas
put it so succinctly in Abington v. Schempp,71 "What may not be done directly,
may not be done indirectly lest the Establishment Clause becomes a mockery."
72
Although the classification of these schools as being indistinguishable from
state-supported colleges seems correct at first blush, the description fails upon
closer examination. Universities such as Notre Dame, Marquette, Sacred Heart,
and Wake Forest are thought of first as sectarian and secondly as great uni-
versities. Providing funds for expansion of religious colleges will certainly have
the effect of advancing their religious mission if just by exposing more students
to their teachings.
The entanglement involved in Tilton, while undoubtedly less than the audits
provided for in Lemon, still entails government supervision of these schools
where none existed before.
In Allen the Court suggested, though obliquely, that government aid had
reached the "verge" of the permissible limits of the establishment clause when
66 Id. at 692 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; accord, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 262 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 693-94 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
69 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
69a Id. at 131.
70 403 U.S. at 694 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
72 Id. at 230 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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textbooks were provided to parochial students. 73 Certainly, the Tilton decision
may be said to be the first step toward the establishment of religion long feared
by the Court.74 Surely, in view of Justice Douglas' reasoning concerning the
application of Engel'some
Church fathers who seek public financing for their schools soon may
find themselves repeating the observation of Pyrrhus: 'With one more
victory like this, the war will be lost.'
75
Another decision like this one and sectarian education may be lost.
Jerry Webb
78 See, Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680 (1969).
74 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ; 330 U.S. at 29. (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ; Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 716 (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, this very decision was both foreshadowed and feared in
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 253 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
75 Salisbury, A Pyrrhic Victory, 66, 6 Liberty 19 (Nov.-Dec., 1971).
